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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(2):
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are
immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting
from those activities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken
or damaged private property without just compensation.
Compensation and damages shall be assessed according
to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4:
Before property can be taken, it must appear:
1.
That the use to which it is to be applied is
a use authorized by law;
2.

That the taking is necessary to such use

• • • •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this appeal, the City does not contest the
Statement of the Case with its statement of Relevant Facts set
forth by plaintiff.

Nevertheless, there are other facts of

record relevant to the issues to be determined by the Court:
1.

In 1983, the City experienced substantial flooding in

several areas.

The floodings affected the Fashion Village Mall

("Mall") when water in Mill Creek, a natural water channel running adjacent to the south wall of the mall, overran the creek
banks and deposited debris against the south wall of the Mall.
See Plaintiff's Brief, Addendum, pp. 25-2S.
2.

After the flood waters receded, Mall representatives

requested the City to make improvements to the Mill Creek
channel at the mall location in order to improve the flood
capacity of the creek.
3.

Id'

The City added the Mall/Mill Creek project to its flood

control construction projects list, but other more pressing
flood control projects took priority over the Mall project.
4.

Id.

In 1985, the City contracted for the design, construc-

tion and financing of a number of flood control projects in the
City, including the Mill Creek channel improvement.

The City

constructed the projects, including the Mall/Mill Creek project,
with Davis County flood control funds, as well as state disaster
relief funds.

Id.

at pp. 29-31.
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5.

The City let bids on the project and awarded the con-

struction contract to McNeil Construction, a co-defendant in
this action.

The contract called for the construction of a

concrete channel for Mill Creek at the Mall location.

Accord-

ing to plaintiff's Complaint, this channel construction caused
or contributed to plaintiff's alleged injury.
6.

Ld« at pp. 27-48.

Plaintiff does not allege in its Complaint or Amended

Complaint that the City intentionally damaged its property or
that the damages sustained were a necessary or unavoidable
result of the construction of the flood control improvements.
Rather, plaintiff alleges that the contract between the City
and McNeil Construction expressly provided that the contractor
"protect as may be necessary all foundations and other parts of
all existing structures adjacent and adjoining the site of the
project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or
other operations connected with the completion of the work under
the contract," and do the work in such a way as "to avoid damage
to adjoining property."
7.

Id. at pp. 7-8, 65-66.

Allegedly because the City or its contractor did not

take reasonable precautions, plaintiff sustained damages to its
property when the contractor diverted Mill Creek over or against
plaintiff's property during installation of the channel.

Ix^

pp. 8-10, 65-68.
8.

Plaintiff claims the construction of the improvement

resulted in the following damages:
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at

(a) Loss of income;
(b) Diminution in value of its Mall;
(c) Costs of repair to its Mall roof, floors, walls,
plumbing, sewer, and fill; and
(d) Reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall
of the Mall.
Id. at pp. 10, 68.
9.

Plaintiff does not allege that the actions of the City

or its contractor have deprived plaintiff of all use of its
property, even temporarily, or that the flow causing the alleged
damages will recur.

Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

Assuming that the legislature employed the words in

§ 63-30-3 advisedly, the statute provides absolute immunity to
municipalities engaged in flood control improvements.

Such an

interpretation does not violate equal-protection standards under
the Utah Constitution because the distinctions made by the
statute reasonably tend to protect monies in the state disaster
relief fund as well as the treasuries of the municipalities
engaged in flood control measures, in order to ensure the government's ability to discharge its wholly public responsibility
with regard to flood control.
2.

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution requir-

ing compensation where private property is damaged for public
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use does not allow plaintiff to recover in this case because
that section of the constitution is not self-executing.

The

legislative waiver enabling recovery under that section was not
passed until two years after the action at issue in this case.
At any rate, damages recoverable under that section are limited
to those damages that are necessary or unavoidable consequences
of governmental action.

Here, plaintiff has alleged damages

that are at most unintentional and unnecessary consequences of
the improvement at issue.
3.

Section 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, which enables a plaintiff to recover for the taking or
damaging of private property for public use under Article I,
Section 22, does not apply to this case for several reasons:
1) the statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did
not exist prior to 1987 and thus cannot be applied retroactively; 2) the statute does not contemplate suits where damages
are unnecessary, and not the unavoidable consequence of the
governmental activity; and 3) the Governmental Immunity Act
itself does not apply the waiver of 63-30-10.5 to suits where
damages were caused by the managing of flood waters.
4.

Plaintiff's contract claim is based wholly upon an

easement for a right-of-way, which under its express terms gave
rise to no obligation by the City, and which the City did not
even sign.

Any rights plaintiff acquires by virtue of its

status as the owner of a servient tenement do not rise to the

-6-

level of contractual rights and remedies sufficient to allow
this case to fall within the waiver of governmental immunity
for contractual obligations.
5.

By its Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiff asked this

Court to take a position taken by no other court, and hold that
damages caused by a single flooding, which did not permanently
invade plaintiff's property, or completely destroy it, and which
there is no allegation will ever recur, constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.

The great weight of authority is

that such alleged damages, even if proven, do not rise to the
level of a taking.

Thus the City maintains that plaintiff's

taking claim under the Fifth Amendment was appropriately dismissed as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-3 IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Plaintiff's first point is that § 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity Act cannot be read to provide absolute immunity to
municipalities engaged in flood control construction because, if
so interpreted, the statute violates the equal-protection clause
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of the Utah Constitution.

However, the trial court's reading

is in accord with the plain language of the statute, and the
statute does not violate equal protection standards.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 Creates Absolute Immunity for
Municipalities Engaged in Flood Control Construction.

In response to flooding which began in the spring of 1983,
and which caused Utah's governor to declare a state of emergency, the Utah legislature passed a "Flood Relief" bill during
the 1984 budget session.

See 1984 Senate Bill 97. The bill

amended § 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The

amended section, with amended portions underlined, reads as
follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [Act]
chapter all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an improved medical, nursing, or other
professional health care clinical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and the construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their
officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
See 1984 Utah Laws, Ch. 33 § 3.
At issue is the language of the second paragraph quoted
above.

Plaintiff insists that it be interpreted as qualified

by the first paragraph, so as to provide only partial immunity

-8-

to municipalities engaged in flood control efforts.

Neverthe-

less, this Court has succinctly stated that the courts of this
state must "[assume] that the terms of the statute are used advisedly and should be given an interpretation and application
which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings."

Board

of Ed. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d
1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).

See also Grant v. Utah State Land

Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Utah 1971) ("foundational rules
require that we assume that each term of the

statute was used

advisedly").
In the face of disastrous flooding and a declared state of
emergency, the legislature here used the terms "governmental
entities • • . are immune from suit for any injury . . . resulting from [the management of flood waters and the construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems]."
Laws, Ch. 33, § 3 (emphasis added).

1984 Utah

Contrary to applicable case

law, plaintiff's proposed interpretation renders meaningless
the last phrase of the amended paragraph wherein the legislature
stated that cities and their employees "are immune from suit."
Id.

Under the rules set forth in Board of Ed. of Granite

School Dist. v. Salt Lake County and Grant v. Utah State Land
Board, this Court should reject plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the statute.
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B.

The Lower Court's Holding that the Statute Grants
Absolute Immunity Does Not Render the Statute
Unconstitutional.

Plaintiff cites Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah
Adv. Rep. 5 (1989), and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), to argue that the statute, as
interpreted by the lower court, violates the equal-protection
clause of the Utah constitution.
pp. 8-11.

See Appellant's Brief, at

Plaintiff argues that because it has a right to a

remedy under the open-courts clause of the Utah constitution,
the standard of review in this case should have more bite than
mere minimum scrutiny.

According to plaintiff, when the statute

is scrutinized at a vaguely defined higher level, it fails to
provide equal protection.

To avoid this result, plaintiff

argues, the statute should be interpreted as providing only
qualified immunity.

Id.

Condemarin and its predecessors, however, are distinguishable from the instant case.

The Court's heightened scrutiny of

the statutes at issue there can not reasonably be applied to the
statute at issue in this case.

When § 63-30-3 is analyzed ac-

cording to appropriate equal protection standards, it does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution,
and there is no need for this Court to adopt plaintiff's
strained interpretation of the statute.
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i.

A Heightened Scrutiny Standard is Inapplicable to
the Statute at issue in this Case.

In Condemarin, as in Berry ex rel. Berry, the right affected by the statute at issue was a right guaranteed under the
open-courts provision to a remedy for personal injury.

In

Condemarin, a majority of this Court reasoned that because the
right was guaranteed under the open-courts provision, a statute
restricting the right should be scrutinized according to "a
heightened standard of review under equal protection."
Condemarin, 107 Utah Adv. Rep., at 11, 20, 23-24.
The Court was careful to point out, however, that the
statute affected the right to sue a governmental entity engaged
in a proprietary function, a right unaffected by sovereign immunity at common-law.

The Court noted that the right in fact

preexisted the enactment of the open-courts provision in the
Utah constitution:
The defendants in this case take the position that
because sovereign immunity was a well-settled
principle at the time the Utah constitution as
adopted, the challenged provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act do not deprive plaintiffs of
any remedies or property rights. This analysis
overlooks the fact that at common law the proprietary
or non-governmental functions of the government
entities were not protected from liability in Utah,
nor were their employees who performed those functions.
*

*

*

. . . Those arguments can only be persuasive if real,
essential governmental functions are at issue. They
do not have the same weight if non-essential, nongovernmental functions are involved.
*

*
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*

. . . In the present case, the legislature has not only
limited recovery, but it has also extended partial governmental immunity to restrict rights which existed of
common law. Therefore, I would apply a heightened
standard of review under equal protection.
See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7-8
(1989) (emphasis in original).

In his separate concurring

opinion, Justice Stewart noted as follows:
Beyond that, the test ['whether the governmental activity under consideration is of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency
or that it is essential to the core of governmental
activity*] articulates the core value protected by governmental immunity—providing protection to the public
treasury and tax revenues against overwhelming losses
so that the essential functions of government will not
be imperiled. The test also identifies where the constitutional right of a person to have a remedy for
personal injury begins under Article I, Section 11 of
the Utah constitution as against a governmental agency,
and where the governmental right to immunity from such
lawsuits stops.
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
By contrast the governmental activity the legislature seeks
to protect with the statute at issue here is the management of
flood waters. The management of flood waters is a "core"
governmental function, and that function can only be performed
by a governmental agency.

Governmental entities were clearly

not liable for such activities at the time of the adoption of
the open-courts provision of the Utah constitution.

As noted

by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983):
Sovereign immunity—the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent—was
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a well-settled principle of American common law at the
time Utah became a state. Article I, Section 11 of the
Utah constitution, which prescribes that all courts
shall be open and persons shall not be barred from
using them to redress injuries, was not meant to create
a new remedy or a new right of action. Consequently,
Article I, Section 11 worked no change in the principle
of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not
unconstitutional under that section.
658 P.2d at 629 (citations omitted).
More particularly, it is a common-law principle that the
sovereign had full immunity from suit for the management of
flood waters.

In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626

(1913), the Court held that the sovereign was immune in a situation where the plaintiff claimed damages resulting from the
state's construction of a flume, or culvert and undershot, for
the purpose of protecting a canal against flood water.

Subse-

quent cases have upheld the principle of government immunity
from suit in cases involving flood control or storm systems.
See, e.g., McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah
1957).
Accordingly, the fact critical to the Court's opinions in
Condemarin and Berry ex rel Berry, that the plaintiffs' right
to a remedy under the open-courts provision was violated by the
statutes, is not present in this case.

The provision of the

Governmental Immunity Act challenged here simply does not
deprive plaintiff of any remedies or property rights which it
enjoyed before enactment of the statute.
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Thus, plaintiff's

equal-protection analysis applying a heightened scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of the legislative action is inappropriate.1
ii.

The Test to be Applied to the Statute is the
Traditional Rational-Basis Standard of Review
Under the Utah Equal Protection Provision.

The overwhelming majority of opinions involving equalprotection attacks on governmental immunity acts employ the
rational basis test.

See, e.g, Aubertin v. Board of Country

Commissioners of Woodson County, Kansas, 588 F.2d 781 (10th
Cir. 1978); Boyce v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); Peddycoart v. Burninqham, 354 So. 2d 808 (Ala. 1978);
Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 596 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1979);
Winston v. Reorganized School District, 5-2, 636 S.W.2d 324
(Mo. 1982); Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of
Education, 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. App. 1981); Paulson v. County of
Pierce, 664 P.2d 1202 (Wash. 1983).
Further, on at least four occasions this Court has applied
the rational basis test when provisions of the Utah Governmental

^•Plaintiff' s argument that its right to a full remedy under the
open-courts provision requires a heightened standard of scrutiny
fails for another reason. In Berry ex rel. v. Berry, this
Court stated that Article I, Section 11 was not violated if
"the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy. . . . " 717 P.2d at 680. Plaintiffs have
also sued the City's contractor, architects who designed the
plaintiff's mall, previous owners of the mall, and various
individuals and John Does. Here there is no showing that
plaintiff will be deprived of a full remedy because of the
immunity of the City.
-14-

Immunity Act have been attacked on equal protection grounds.
See, e.g., Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978); Sears v.
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); Crowder v. Salt Lake
County, 552 P.2d 656 (Utah 1976); and Gallegos v. Midvale City,
492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972).
Accordingly, to determine whether the trial court's interpretation of § 63-30-3(2) violates the equal-protection clause
of the Utah Constitution as plaintiff asserts, this Court should
apply the rational basis test.
iii. Appropriate Equal Protection Analysis Results in
a Finding that § 63-30-3(2) Does not Violate Equal
Protection Standards.
In Utah Public Employees Assn. v. State, 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah
1980), this Court quoted with approval the United States Supreme
Court's decision in which the principles of analysis under the
rational basis test were enunciated:
1.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws. but admits of
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore purely arbitrary.
2.
A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice
it results in some inequity.
3.
When the classification in such a law is called
in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed.
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4.
One who assails the classification in such a law
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary.
610 P.2d at 1274 (citations omitted).
More recently, in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984),
this Court applied the rational basis test in a case involving
an equal-protection attack on the Utah Guest Statute.

The Court

there held that a statute may treat individuals differently and
yet meet constitutional equal-protection standards if:

(1) The

law applies equally to all persons within a class, and (2) the
statutory classification and different treatment given the class
are based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to
further the statutory objectives.
Plaintiff argues that § 63-30-3(2) violates equal-protection
because the distinctions it creates have no reasonable tendency
to further the legislative objective which plaintiff proposes
for the statute.

See Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Particularly,

plaintiff assumes that the legislature's objective is "to
strengthen flood control efforts," and then argues that granting absolute immunity for flood control efforts, and granting
only qualified immunity for other governmental functions such
as road construction, does not reasonably further the legislative objective.

However, plaintiff's argument fails in light

of the above-cited principles.
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First, there are plausible legislative objectives besides
the objective "to strengthen flood control efforts."

It is a

matter of record that the City constructed the flood control improvement at issue in this case with flood control funds from
Davis County, and with state disaster relief funds.
such funds are not inexhaustible.

Clearly

The objective of the statute

may have been to protect monies in the state disaster relief
fund as well as the treasuries of the municipalities engaged in
flood control measures, in order to ensure the government's
ability to discharge its wholly public responsibility with
regard to flood control.
Second, the distinction the statute makes between persons
harmed by flood control construction and persons harmed by other
governmental activities only fails to further the legislative
objective if it is possible, as plaintiff argues, to equate
"long-term flood control improvements" and road construction
and other necessary public improvements.

However, there are

clear differences between the two governmental activities, and
the distinction in the statute is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
For example, governmental entities regularly budget for road
construction and other public improvements as part of their
normal operating budget and as part of ordinary city business.
While the plaintiff unilaterally describes the improvement in
this case as a "long-term flood control improvement", clearly
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the improvement was not planned by the City as part of its
normal operating budget nor was it a public improvement undertaken in the course of ordinary city business. Rather, the
improvement was constructed in response to severe flooding, with
the benefit of Davis County flood funds and state disaster
relief funds.

The City could not budget for a natural disaster

like the flooding of the early 1980's as part of its normal
fiscal plan.

Thus, the statutory distinction granting absolute

immunity for flood control improvements like the one here, and
granting only qualified immunity for road construction and other
public improvements, furthers the legislative purpose of protecting state disaster relief funds, and other flood control funds.
In short, the distinctions made by the statute at issue here
reasonably tend to further the legitimate public purpose of protecting public funds and governmental entities' ability to
discharge their public responsibilities with regard to flood
control.

Thus, the statute as interpreted by the lower court

does not violate the equal-protection provisions of the Utah
Constitution.

-18-

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING; AND WHETHER OR
NOT IT IS SELF-EXECUTING, DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
THEREUNDER ARE LIMITED TO DAMAGES THAT ARE
NECESSARY OR UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES OF
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION.
Plaintiff goes to considerable lengths to set forth its position that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is
self-executing and constitutes consent by the state to be sued.
The City maintains that the point is moot given the subsequent
enactment of § 63-30-10.5, and because whether or not Article I,
Section 22 is self-executing it does not allow plaintiff to recover damages where at most unintentional and unnecessary damage
to property is alleged.
A.

Prior Decisions by this Court Establish that Article I,
Section 22 is not Self-Executing and Subsequent Legislation has Obviated any Need for this Court to Overturn
its Prior Decisions.

In 1985, when the improvement at issue was constructed, Utah
case law clearly established that Article I, Section 22 was not
self-executing and did not constitute consent by the state to be
sued.

The law on this issue was set forth in the opinions of

Utah Supreme Court Justices Henriod and Wade.

Their opinions,

concurring opinions, dissents and rebuttals in Springville
Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960); Fairclough v.
Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960); and State Road Commission v. Parker, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah 1952) established that
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consent for the state and governmental entities to be sued was
a legislative matter, and would not be created nor inferred by
the courts.
That rule continued, without any change whatsoever, up to
the passage by the legislature of the Governmental Immunity Act.
See Hurst v. Highway Dept., 397 P.2d 71 (Utah 1964); and Sine
v. Helland, 418 P.2d 979 (Utah 1966).

The Governmental Immunity

Act then "substituted a statutory framework" for the common law
of sovereign immunity existing prior thereto in the state "to be
interpreted by the courts and reshaped by the legislature as necessary from time to time."

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,

629-30 (Utah 1983).
The Act originally did not provide consent for the sovereign to be sued for "taking" or "damaging" private property for
public use.

The Act retained sovereign immunity, except as

waived therein.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953).

Thus, in Holt

v. Utah State Road Commission, 522 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973), the
Court quoted the language of the Act, "except as may be otherwise provided in this act. . . " to indicate the legislature's
intention that the act be strictly construed to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein.
Holt, 522 P.2d at 1287-88.
In 1987 the legislature enacted § 63-30-10.5, waiving immunity for the "taking or damaging" of private property for public
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use.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1987).

The legislature

thus obviated any need for this Court to overturn its prior decisions.

However, as will be discussed in the following

points, that section does not allow plaintiff to recover in
this case.
B.

Even if Article I, Section 22 Were Self-Executing, it
Would Not Allow Plaintiff to Recover Against Bountiful
City Under the Facts Alleged in This Case.

In this case there are no allegations that the damages resulting to plaintiffs property were necessary or unavoidable
consequences of the City's action.

In fact, plaintiff affirma-

tively alleges that the contract between the City and its
contractor expressly provided that the contractor would
construct the flood control system in such a way as to avoid
any damage to adjoining property.

The question thus presented

is even assuming Article I, Section 22 were self-executing,
could the City be liable under Utah law where the City did not
deliberately take private property for public use, nor did it
cause necessary or

unavoidable damages to property by its

action, but private property was nonetheless allegedly damaged
by negligence.
Initially, it should be noted that interpreting Article I,
Section 22 as requiring compensation where property is damaged
unintentionally and unnecessarily by municipal action is inconsistent with the language of the provision itself.

That provi-

sion requires governmental entities to pay just compensation
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for private property damaged "for public use." It must be
assumed according to the standard rules of statutory interpretation cited previously that the legislature used those terms
advisedly.

Board of Ed. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake

County and Grant v. Utah State Land Board, supra. Nevertheless,
plaintiff's property was not damaged "for" public use, rather
plaintiff alleges it was damaged "by" public use, inadvertently,
negligently, without purpose, and without any benefit to the
public whatsoever.

See, e.g., Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389

P.2d 23, 24 (Wyo. 1964) ("According to the constitutional
provision set out above [plaintiffs] would be entitled to
compensation from the public only if they allege and prove their
property was damaged 'for public . . . use.'").
Subsequent legislative acts also indicate that Utah's eminent domain law requires compensation only for property damaged
deliberately, or for property that is damaged as a necessary
consequence, rather than as an unintentional consequence of governmental action.
discussed above.

In 1987 the legislature enacted § 63-30-10.5,
Employing the language of the constitutional

provision at issue, that section waives immunity for taking or
damaging private property and provides that "compensation and
damages should be assessed according to the requirements of
Chapter 34, Title 78." See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1987).
Title 78 then expressly provides that payment for the taking
and damaging of private property can only be obtained where the
-22-

damage is unavoidable, or a necessary consequence of the public
use.

Section 78-34-4 provides in pertinent part:
Before property can be taken it must appear:
1.
that the use to which it is to be applied is
a use authorized by law;
2.

that the taking is necessary to such use

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1981).

Further, § 78-34-10 states

that, "if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will
be damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement, the
amount of such damages [must be assessed]."
§ 78-34-10(3) (1953).

Utah Code Ann.

Since unintentional, unnecessary or

negligent damages cannot be assessed before construction of a
proposed improvement, and the language of the above cited
sections contemplates "necessary" damages and payment for
property that "will be damaged" by construction, the plain
legislative intent is that unintentional, unnecessary or
negligent damages are not compensable in an imminent domain
proceeding.

See, e.g., Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake

City, 49 P.2d 405 (Utah 1935) ("Damages arising out of the
carelessness or negligence or indifference in the construction
of a utility upon land taken for public use are not damages
contemplated by the statutes as recoverable under the
principles of law pertaining to eminent domain proceedings").
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Consistent with the legislative intent described above, this
Court has repeatedly stated that accidental or negligent injury
to private property by government action is not compensable
under Article I, Section 22.

In Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200

P. 510 (Utah 1921), plaintiffs sued to recover damages for
injury to certain fish ponds and destruction of fish alleged to
have resulted from the County's flushing of water through a reservoir owned and controlled by the County.

Apparently, water

released by the County entered an overflow ditch and eventually
reached plaintiff's pond.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's claim under
Article I, Section 22. Fundamental principles of that law, said
the Court, require that the property taken be taken for a public
use, that the structural work causing injury be for a public
purpose, that it be authorized by law, and that the damage for
which compensation was claimed be a necessary consequence of the
public use.
We are clearly of the opinion that the damages for
which compensation is allowed under Article I,
Section 22 of the State Constitution are such as are
the direct consequences of the lawful exercise of the
right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such
damages are unavoidable.
id. at 514.
Subsequently, even Justice Wade, who was the most adament
that Article I, Section 22 was self-executing and thus allowed
a suit in inverse condemnation, would not permit such a suit to
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extend to cases alleging only unintentional and unnecessary
damages.

In his concurring opinion in Springville Banking, he

wrote:
Such compensation must result from or grow out of a
public use of property, either the property taken or
other property used for the public purpose . . . .
Such public use must be one the state is entitled to
make, and it must be intentionally made by the duly
constituted public officers and not be merely the
result of negligence or other wrongful acts which
create ordinary tort liability.
Springville Banking, 349 P.2d at 166.
In his dissent in Fairelough, Justice Wade wrote:
This provision [Article I, Section 22] clearly requires
the damaging of tangible private property, and that the
public use must be intentional and not merely accidental or negligently caused. So damages from personal
injuries or from breach of contract and all damages
except from an intentional public use are not included
in such consent . . . .
. . . [I]t is generally recognized that accidental or
negligent injury is not a damage to private property
for public use.
Fairclough,. 354 P.2d at 110-11 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff's responds to Lund v. Salt Lake County and the
other cases cited above by attempting to distinguish the facts
relied on by the court in Lund from the facts of the instant
case.

Plaintiff argues that the governmental act in Lund, the

release of water from a reservoir, was simply the "ministerial"
performance of a public function.
basis for plaintiff's distinction.
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However, there is no logical

The governmental action in this case, the lining of a stream
channel with concrete for flood control purposes, is just as
"ministerial" or is just as much a "mere public function" as the
flushing of water through the County owned reservoir in Lund.
The critical fact common to both

cases is that the government

activity was pursuant to a purely public duty and that the activity resulted in damages that were wholly unintentional and
unnecessary to the proper performance of the activity.

Where

damage so wrought is not a necessary consequence or result of a
public undertaking, the claim for damages is a claim in tort and
should not be given constitutional status.

See, e.g., Harris v.

United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1953); Chavez v.
City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 1964); Dallas County
Flood Control District v. Benson, 306 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex.
1937).
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED THAT
§ 63-30-10.5 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The City maintains that § 63-30-10.5 does not apply to this
case for several reasons: (1) the statute gives rise to a new
cause of action which did not exist prior to 1987 and thus cannot
be applied retroactively; (2) the statute does not contemplate
suits where damages are not a necessary, unavoidable consequence
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of the governmental activity; and (3) the Governmental Immunity
Act itself does not apply the waiver of § 63-30-10.5 to suits
where damages were caused by the management of flood waters.
The principles relating to retroactive application of laws
enacted by the legislature are settled.

As stated in Oakland

Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 520 P.2d 108 (Utah 1974),
a later statute or amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to impose a greater liability upon a party unless
the later statute or amendment deals only with a clarification
or amplification as to how the law should have been understood
prior to its enactment.

In Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial

Comm., 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986), this Court stated:
[T]he law establishing substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not a
subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution
of a dispute . . . .
[H]owever, statutes which are
procedural only and do not create, alter or destroy
substantive rights may be applied to causes of action
that have accrued or are pending at the time the
statute is enacted.
725 P.2d at 1336-37.
In the instant case, prior to 1987 the law was clear that
sovereign immunity barred a suit against a governmental entity
for taking or damaging private property for public use.

The

1987 enactment of § 63-30-10.5 waived such immunity with respect
to certain governmental activities, and thus created a substantive right to sue governmental entities which theretofore had
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not existed.

According to the principles cited above, it should

not be applied retroactively to this case, where the project in
question was undertaken in 1985, two years before the amendment.
Secondly, § 63-30-10.5 expressly limits the damages recoverable thereunder by reference to Chapter 34, Title 78 of the Utah
Code.

That title and chapter expressly provides that compensa-

tion for taking and damaging is only recoverable where the
damages are:

(1) authorized by law, (2) necessary to such use,

and (3) contemplated in advance of the improvement.
Code Ann. §§ 78-34-4, and 78-34-10(3).2

See Utah

In this case, where

the damages alleged are merely accidentally or negligently
caused, they are not recoverable under § 63-30-10.5.
Finally, the legislature has restricted the enabling effect
of § 63-30-10.5 by placing it in the Act as a waiver of immunity.

As a waiver of immunity, it applies only where the appli-

cable immunity is qualified.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1).

Section 63-30-10.5 and all other express waivers of immunity
have no application where the immunity in force is absolute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(2).

Only where the government

taking or damaging results from exercises of government functions other than those governmental functions enumerated in the

2

Such an interpretation of §§ 78-34-4 and 78-34-10(s) is
consistent with the language of constitutional provisions
requiring compensation for damages "for public use." See
Section 11(B) supra.
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second paragraph of § 63-30-3 does § 63-30-10.5 enable suit in
accordance with Article I, Section 22.
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED THAT
PLAINTIFF HAS NO BASIS FOR AN IMPLIED
CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST BOUNTIFUL CITY.
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent governmental immunity by
bootstrapping its rights as the owner of a servient tenement
into a breach of contract claim against the City.

See

Plaintiffs Brief at pp. 40-42.
Nevertheless, plaintiff's contract claim is based wholly
upon a right-of-way agreement, copies of which were attached to
both the City's and plaintiff's original memoranda.

The docu-

ment is nothing more than an easement granted by the plaintiff
to the City to perform the various flood control work which
plaintiff had requested of the City.

Under the express terms

of the right-of-way agreement, the City has no obligations.
The City did not even sign the document.
Plaintiff cites Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 80 P.2d 431,
477 (Utah 1948), to support its proposition that accepting an
easement creates contractual obligations.

See Plaintiff's

Brief, at p. 41. Nevertheless, in Bracklein, the Court merely
held that a grantee's acceptance of a deed containing a mortgage assumption clause makes the obligations created by the deed
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a written contract, and not subject to limitations periods
governing oral contracts.
is distinguishable.

80 P.2d at 477. Clearly, Bracklein

There is no agreement between the City and

plaintiff creating enforceable contract rights and remedies sufficient to allow this case to fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for contractual obligations.
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF
HAS NOT AND CANNOT ALLEGE A "TAKING" UNDER THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
In contrast to the confusing array of cases interpreting
state constitutions requiring just compensation for "taking or
damaging" private property, it has long been established under
the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution that a governmental entity is not liable for unnecessary or tortious damages
resulting from a governmental activity. See e.g., Transportation
Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879); Gibson v. United States, 166
U.S. 269 (1897); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945).

Thus, under the Fifth Amendment "the essential

inquiry is whether the injury to the claimant's property is in
the nature of a tortious invasion of his rights or rises to the
magnitude of an appropriation of some interest in his property
permanently to the use of the government."

National Byproducts,

Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (Ct. CI. 1969).
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In this case, plaintiff has alleged and could allege only
unintended, unnecessary and wholly avoidable damages resulting
from the City's acts.

Plaintiff does not allege that the City

has acquired any of its property even temporarily for public
use.

Such allegations, even if proven, establish only tortious

injury to plaintiff's property by a governmental entity.

Such

allegations are not sufficient to state a taking claim under the
Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution.
This conclusion is in accord with principles long established by the Supreme Court in analogous cases.

In Sanquinetti

v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), a governmental entity
authorized construction of a connecting canal over plaintiff's
property and between two bodies of water.

The canal was con-

structed in accordance with plans prepared by government
engineers who apparently believed that the capacity of the canal
would prove sufficient under all circumstances.

However, during

several successive high water years, the canal was insufficiently large to carry away flood waters.

The canal overflowed the

lands of the plaintiff, damaging and destroying crops and trees
and injuring to some extent the land itself.
was permanently flooded, however.

None of the land

264 U.S. at 146-47.

Plaintiff brought suit for a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Citing earlier decisions on the issue, the Supreme Court
noted as follows:
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In order to create an enforceable liability
against the government, it is, at least, necessary
that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of
the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not
merely an injury to, the property.
264 U.S. at 149 (citations omitted.)

The Court found the refer-

enced conditions not met and held that because the plaintiff was
not ousted from his land, nor the customary use of his land prevented, his injury was, in its nature, indirectly consequential,
for which no implied obligation on the part of the government
could arise under the Fifth Amendment,

^d. at 150.

Other courts have followed Sanquinetti in cases substantially analogous to the instant case, stating the general rule that
under such circumstances, there has been no "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment.

See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 P.2d

857 (6th Cir. 1978) ("When a land owner is damaged by release
of water through a dam, or a change in flooding patterns is
caused by construction of levies, courts have frequently denied
compensation, saying that the flood involves at most a tort, not
a taking."); Hartwiq v. United States, 485 F.2d 615 (Ct. CI.
1973) (finding plaintiff's allegations insufficient to make a
Fifth Amendment taking claim since plaintiffs did not show that
their property would be subjected to inevitably recurring
flooding due to the action of the government); National
Byproducts Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256 (Ct. CI. 1969)
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("Courts have held that one, two or three floodings by
themselves do not constitute a taking.

The plaintiff must esta-

blish that the flooding will 'inevitably recur.'"); Fromme v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1196 (Ct. CI. 1969) ("one flooding
. . . or two floodings . . . cannot be regarded as a taking of
a permanent interest in the affected land.").
In its brief, plaintiff does not dispute the rule stated
above, but appears to argue that because Bountiful City's
alleged action has had a negative economic impact on plaintiff's
investment in the mall property, there may be some state of
facts provable in support of it's claim.

See Appellant's Brief,

at 39. To the extent plaintiff is arguing that damage to and
depreciation in value of property alone can constitute a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment, its position is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court decisions uniformly rejecting such
arguments.

See e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New

York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (previous decisions "uniformly
reject the proposition that diminution in property value,
standing alone, can establish a 'taking.'") (citing Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (76% diminution in value
not a taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 238 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5%
diminution in value not a taking).
In sum, by its Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiff asks this
Court to adopt a position taken by no other court plaintiff can
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point to, and hold that damages caused by a single flooding,
which did not permanently invade plaintiff's property, or completely destroy it, and where there is no allegation that the
flooding will ever recur, constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.

By contrast, the great weight of authority holds

that such alleged damages, even if proven, do not rise to the
level of a taking.

Thus, the City respectfully submits that

plaintiff's taking claim under the Fifth Amendment was
appropriately dismissed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court below correctly
dismissed causes of action in plaintiff's Complaint and First
Amended Complaint against the City as a matter of law.

The

City respectfully submits that the judgment of the Court below
should be upheld.
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